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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
RA Yl\10ND HIRSCHBACH,
Appellant and Plaintiff,
-vs.No. 8661
DUBUQUE PACKING CO.,
a corporation, and
GIFFORD-vVILSON,
Respondents and Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

FACTS OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a Sumnmry Judgment entered
February 21, 1957, dismissing the Amended Complaint
of Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff (R. 40).
On May 29, 1956, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint alleging that on or about September 5, 1955, on
U.S. Highway 40-50, a public highway within the State
of Utah, approximately four n1iles west of I\::nolls, Utah,
Defendants negligently parked a motor vehicle and as a
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result a collision occurred, causing damage to Plaintiff's
motor vehicle in amount $6,921.79, loss of use in amount
$1,500.00 and damage to cargo in amount $2,399.20 (R.
9, 10, 11).
On December 17, preliminary motions having been
disposed of, Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim admitting the collision but denying the other mate-

i:.:

··-·

rial allegations of the Amended Complaint, alleging
contributory negligence upon the part of Plaintiff's
driver and demanding damages by way of counterclaim
in amount $8,358.27 (R. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28).
Also on December 17, 1956, Defendants served and
filed Interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33, t-:-tah Rules
of Civil Procedure, designed to obtain an admission that
there wa.s no obstruction to the vision or view of Plaintiff's driver at the time he .approached the place where
Defendants' tractor and trailer were parked (R. 29, 30).
The Answer to these Interrogatories showed that the
view of Plaintiff's driver was not obstructed (R. 33).
On ~ebruary 7, Defendants served their Motion for
Sumrnary Judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, upon the ground that as a matter of law
Plaintiff's driver \Yas negligent and such negligence
wa.s a proxi1nate can~e of the accident and damage sustaine<l by Plaintiff (R. 38). This Inotion was noticed
for he.aring on February 19, 1956, and in view of the
diffienlty of obtaining an affidavit from Plaintiff's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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driver, a non-resident, it was agreed between counsel for
Plaintiff and Defendants that counsel for Plaintiff file
an affidavit based upon the written statement of Plaintiff's driver, in lieu of the driver's affidavit. This agreement was brought to the attention of the Court prior
to the hearing on Defendants' motion and for purposes
of the motion the facts summarized in the affidavit were
taken .as true. From this affidavit the following facts
appear:
Immediately prior to the accident, Plaintiff's driver,
Byers, was proceeding in a westerly direction along U. S.
Highway 40-50 at approximately 40 miles per hour. It
was night tirile. The weather was cle.ar and visibility was
good. The highway wa.s straight, level, dry, black-top
and in a good condition. It consisted of two lanes
separated by a painted line. Byers had his driving and
clearance lights on. His driving lights were sufficient
to disclose vehicles at a distance of at least 350 feet
ahead and were functioning properly. Byers' brakes
were sufficient to stop his truck and trailer within 30
feet after application at a speed of 20 miles per hour
and were in good working order. As Byers approached
the scene of the accident, he observed the clearance
lights of Defendants' trailer ahead of him. At this time
Byers could have stopped in time to avoid a collision.
However, he erroneously concluded that Defendants'
trailer was moving. He continued to observe the trailer
as he .approached, but remained under the erroneous
impression that it was Inoving in the same direction he
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was. When Byers realized that the trailer was stopped,
he immediately swerved to the left and endeavored to
apply his brakes; but he was unable to avoid the collision.
There were no flares warning of the presence of Defendants' trailer; there was no flagman directing traffic;
there was no warning of any kind to approaching traffic
that the trailer was stopped except the n1ere presence
of the trailer itself (R. 36, 37).
The Court concluded that Plaintiff's driver was
guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the accident as a matter of law under the rule announced in
Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co., 80 "Ctah 331,
15 P.(2d) 309 (1932), and entered judgment dismissing
plaintiff's Amended Con1plaint, from which judgment
this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Plaintiff
licable to the
issue of fact
negligence of

contends that the Dalley Case is not apfacts of this case and, therefore, a genuine
exists relatiYe to the alleged contributory
Plaintiff's driver.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
In the Dalley Case the plaintiff's automobile struck
.an unlighted truck parked partly upon the traveled portion of the highway. The court said plaintiff either did
not keep a lookout ahead or if he did he either did not
heed what he saw or could not see the truck because his
lights were not such as were prescribed by law-either
of the.se alternatives constituting negligence as a matter
of law. In that case, the plaintiff testified that he did not
see the standing truck until he was within 15 or 20 feet
of it, that he was then so close that he was unable to
avoid the collision.
Citing Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey) 61 Utah 465, 214
P. 304 (1923), and OJBrien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213
P. 791 (1923), the Utah Supreme Court said:
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established that it is negligence as a matter of law for
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians,
at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot be stopped within a distance at which the
operator of said car is able to see objects upon the
highway in front of him."
It is apparent that in the case now before this Court
the driver could have stopped within the distance at
which he was able to see objects upon the highway in
front of him and hence the very foundation of the Dalley
Case will not support its application to this case.
It is believed that a brief resume of the decisions
considering the Dalley Case may serve to point up the
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fundamental differences of the case now before this
Court.
In Hansen v. Clyde, et al., 89 Utah 31, 56 P. (2d)
1366 (1936), the failure of the plaintiff driver to see
the barrier which his automobile struck was due to the
character of his headlights and a curve in the highway.
Citing the Dalley Case, our Supreme Court said:
"When a driver upon a public highway with
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 feet
ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such speed
as will enable him to stop within that distanee."
The facts alleged in Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 rtah
401, 62 P.(2d) 117 (1936), were held not to bring that
case within the rule of the Dalley Case where the driver
w.as suddenly and unexpectedly blinded by the headlights of an oncoming car.
A similar result wa.s reached where there was an
accumulation of sn1oke and n1ist with visibility further
impaired by the glare of headlights of an approaching
.automobile . .Llloss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 Utah
253, 98 P.(2d) 363, (1940).
In Olson v. Dcnl'er & R.G.Tr.R. Co., et al., 98 Utah
208, 98 P.(2d) 9±-l: (1940), our Supren1e Court said that
railroads have a right to presu1ne that 1notorists on crossing streets will proceed carefully and lawfully and will
drive with their ears in such control as to be able to stop
within the distance at which they can see objects ahead.
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Where a bus driver entered a patch of dense fog
suddenly, it was held that he was not guilty of negligence
as a matter of law in striking an automobile upon th8
highway in Trimble, et ux., v. Union Pacific Stages, et al.,
105 Utah 457, 14:2 P.(2d) 674 (1943); and, a curve in
the road obscuring the obstruction was sufficient to avoid
application of the Dalley Case in Hodges v. Waite, 2
Utah (2d) 152, 270 P. (2d) 461, (1954).
In Wright v. Maynard, 120 Utah 504, 235 P.(2d)
916 (1951), the court observed that although the driver
was not able to stop within the distance he could see
sub.stantial objects in front of him, still he saw them in
time and had sufficient control of his car to turn aside
and avoid running into them had they remained stationary. The plaintiff, however, moved from his position
near the door of a stalled car and jumped into the path
of defendant's car. It was held to be a question for the
jury to determine whether defendant's inability to stop
was the proximate cause of the accident or whether that
cause was the unexpected change of position by plaintiff.
In Takataro Skiba, et al., v. Weiss, et al., 3 Utah
(2d) 256, 282 P. ( 2d) 341 ( 1955), an accident occurred
on a stretch of highway which was straight and level for
at least a distance of about one-half mile from the point
where the collision occurred and since there was no evidence of .any obstructions to the view of the driver, and
since there was additional evidence of exces.sive speed,
the court said by way of dictum that the driver of the
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automobile in striking a truck parked partly on and
partly off the highway was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law. This point, however, was not directly
involved in the appeal.
In Benson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R.
Co., et al., 4 Utah (2d) 38, 286 P.(2d) 790 (1955), the
court reaffirrned the rule announced in Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co., in its identical language:
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established that it is negligence as a matter of law for
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians,
at such a rate of .speed that said automobile cannot be stopped within the distance at which the
operator of said car is able to see objects upon
the highway in front of him."
The facts bringing the Ben.son Case within the rule of
the Dalley Case were the admissions of the plaintiff
that he was traveling at a speed at which he could not
stop his automobile within the distance of visibility.
The Dalley rule was again applied in Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah (2d) 290, 300 P. (2d) 642 (1956), where an
overturned aut01nobile was observed on the east half
of a paved road b~r a Ringsby truck driver who was
traveling south on the west half of the paven1ent. The
truck driver stopped a short distance beyond the wreck
and parked partly on the west shoulder. While he was
preparing to set out flares, plaintiff, driving north,
s1nashed into the dmnaged car apparently because of
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being temporarily blinded by the lights of the truck.
In holding the negligence of the plaintiff to be for the
jury the court said :
"The rule that a motorist is normally required
to so operate his machine as to be able to see
and avoid substantial discernible object~ in the
road ahead is generally recognized, as is its concommitant that the motorist must equip his machine with proper headlights and be able to stop
within the distance of the lights' projection. However, this does not mean that a motorist striking
an object in the highway is guilty of negligence
as a matter of law under any and all conditions.
The case of Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.(2d) 309 upon which appellant relies merely announces that general rule,
holding that the plaintiff who struck an unlighted
truck on an unobstructed highway was guilty of
contributory negligence either in failing to maintain the proper lighting equipment or in failing
to observe what proper lights would have shown."
These decisions have been briefly summarized to
illustrate the factual foundation essential for the application of the rule. In each of the cases where the rule
has been applied the driver has been guilty of negligence
in one or more of these particulars :
1. Driving at a speed rendering it impossible to
stop within the range of apparent visibility; or

2. Failing either to see or heed that which would
have been visible at a time when a collision could have
been avoided at the speed then employed; or
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3. Improper lights or brakes.
Here, none of these is present. The driver of Plaintiff's truck could have stopped within the range of his
headlights, could have avoided the collision after discovering the presence of Defendants' truck and had his
truck equipped with proper lights and brake.s. Here,
~ :Q~yg at most a ~ere error J!l judgment-a matter
traditionally within the province of the jury. Smith v.
Bennett, 1 Utah (2d) 224, 265 P. (2d) 401 (1953).
In the Dalley Case, the parked truck was unlighted;
here, there were the usual driving lights. This might
on first impression seem to make Plaintiff's driver all
the more negligent, yet, on further consideration it is
obvious that this very fact cau.sed his confusion.
Where the parked vehicle is unlighted, as in the
Dalley Case, or is not a vehicle normally found on roads,
as in the Benson Case, or is not in a normal position,
as in the Fretz Case, no exercise of judgment is required.
Defendant.s' truck being in a position normally occupied
by moving vehicles, lighted in the customary fashion,
engendered the n1isconception and proximately caused
the accident.
It was so held in Davis, et al., vs. Browne, et u.x.,
(Wash., 1944) 147 P.(2d) 263, where suit was brought
by Davis and others for personal injuries sustained as
a result of ,a collision between the Davis car and the
Browne ear. rl,he road where the collision occurred was
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

straight and level; the Browne car was stopped in the
middle of the yellow line dividing the two northerly
lanes for the purpose of a change of seats and drivers.
The tail lights of the car were aglow as were the headlights. The Davis car approached from the same direction at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour. The driver
observed the Browne car at a distance which he estimated
to be 500 feet. He thought the car was moving and veered
slightly to the left with the apparent intention of passing
the Browne car. When about 100 feet from the Browne
car he realized that it was not in motion and immediately
applied his brakes and swerved to the left to .avoid a
collision. The right front end of the Davis car struck
the left rear end of the Browne car. In affirming a
judgment for the plaintiffs the Supreme Court of Washington said :
"The mere fact that Davis did not realize
that the Browne car was stationary upon the highway until he himself was within approximately
one hundred feet of it cannot be said to constitute
negligence on his part regardless of all other circumstances. It was, of course, his duty to exercise reasonable care, under the existing circumstances, to observe the presence of the automobile
ahead of him and avoid coming in contact with
it. At the same time, he had the right to assume,
until the contrary became reasonably apparent,
that other users of the highway would conform
to the rule:::; of the road, and, likewise, to assume
that a car ahead of hin1 wa.s in motion rather
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than that it was standing still in the middle of the
road contrary to the positive injunction of the
statute."

• • •
"In this instance, Davis was traveling along
a course and at a rate of speed in conformity to
law. Seeing the car ahead and thinking it was
in motion, he veered slightly to his left when two
hundred fifty feet away, with the evident intention of overtaking and passing that car. Had
the car ahead been moving, Davis most probably
would have succeeded in passing it in safety.
It was not until he was within approximately one
hundred feet of the Browne car, that either he
or his companions realized that it was standing
still. We are unable to say that the trial court
was in error in refusing to hold that, under the
existing circumstances, Davis was guilty of negligence in not sooner discovering that the Browne
car was stationary."
There was a vigorous dissent in this case by one
justice who viewed this as an ··assured clear distance
ahead" case, under a doctrine which had been the law
of the State of \V ashington since 1920, the doctrine of
our own Dalley Case. Ebling v. Xielsen, et al., (\Yash.,
1920) 186 P. 887. Thus, in a jurisdiction committed to
the Dalley rule the error in judgment distinction was
recognized. To fail to recognize this distinction under
modern traffic conditions would, to use the words of
Justice Vvolfe, ·· ... 1nake driving at night on n1uch used
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arterials practically an in1possibility." Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 Utah 253, 98 P.(2d) 363 (1940),
dissenting opinion.
Today's traffic realities quite literally require split
second decisions. A minimu1n legal headlight will disclose
objects only 350 feet ahead. 41-6-134(a), U. C. A., 1953.
A minimum legal brake will not stop an automobile going
at the maximum legal speed at night time of 50 miles
per hour in less than 250.9 feet, 41-6-144(b), U. C. A.,
1953, leaving only 100 feet for perception time and reaction time, which, at 50 miles per hour, allows only
about 1.4 seconds. Perception time and reaction time
vary from approximately % of one second under daylight conditions to as much as three seconds under night
time conditions. Even applying, however, the daylight
average reaction time as was done in the Benson Case
reduces the time for Inaking a decision, which could
perhaps be termed the "judgment time," to approximately .6 seconds. A person having a three second reaction
time under night time conditions, of course, would have
insufficient time to stop, much less for the exercise of
judgment.
The time for the exercise of judgment under conditions permissible under the Inotor vehicle code is exceedingly small and ,a slight indecision, a slight delay,
an erroneous first impression or a momentary confusion may indeed be fatal.
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Reasonable minds can differ as to whether such indecision, delay or momentary confusion is negligence
under the circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
Appellants re.spectfully urge that there was a substantial question of fact generated by the pleadings,
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatories and Affidavit, all before the Court at the time of hearing upon
Defendants' :Motion for Summary Judgment. This question of fact is : Did the failure of Plaintiff's driver to
perceive that Defendants' truck was stopped on the highway, rather than moving, amount to negligence or was
thi_s an error in judgment consistent with the exercise
of due care~ This being so, the lower Court erred in
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with
prejudice and upon the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, "\VORSLEY, SNOvV
& CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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